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Abstract
We represent the functioning of the housing market and study the relation
between income segregation, income inequality and house prices by introducing a
spatial Agent-Based Model (ABM). Differently from traditional models in urban
economics, we explicitly specify the behavior of buyers and sellers and the price
formation mechanism. Buyers who differ by income select among heterogeneous
neighborhoods using a probabilistic model of residential choice; sellers employ an
aspiration level heuristic to set their reservation offer price; prices are determined
through a continuous double auction. We first provide an approximate analytical
solution of the ABM, shedding light on the structure of the model and on the effect
of the parameters. We then simulate the ABM and find that: (i) a more unequal
income distribution lowers the prices globally, but implies stronger segregation; (ii)
a spike of the demand in one part of the city increases the prices all over the city;
(iii) subsidies are more efficient than taxes in fostering social mixing.
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1 Introduction
The allocation of people into the most productive cities is becoming an issue of
central importance in a globalized world. For example, Hsieh and Moretti (2018)
calculate that U.S. GDP could be 36% higher had workers been able to settle in the
most productive areas. Within cities, the place where people live and the way they
are distributed has tremendous consequences on educational and labor opportuni-
ties (Benabou, 1993) and on the provision of public goods (Tiebout, 1956). Spatial
segregation of households along different income groups influences the wealth distri-
bution and contributes to income inequality (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011; Rognlie,
2016). A better understanding of the relation between segregation, income inequal-
ity and house prices and of the policies that are designed to deal with these issues
is the main focus of this paper.
From a theoretical perspective, the residential income distribution has tradi-
tionally been studied using spatial equilibrium models (Fujita, 1989; Duranton and
Puga, 2015). These models assume that for each income group there exists a con-
stant utility level across the city, and solve for the equilibrium prices yielding the
same utility in each neighborhood. This framework allows for several non-trivial
insights about the residential choices of fully optimizing agents. However, it does
not explicitly represent the behavior of buyers and sellers and does not illustrate
the market dynamics that lead some households to segregate in certain areas of the
city (or to be segregated out of the city).
In this paper we build on a substantial body of work on Agent-Based Models
(ABMs) of the housing market to introduce a parsimonious and tractable ABM
specifically suited to study income segregation. Differently from spatial equilibrium
models, the outcomes of our ABM result from unconstrained interactions between
economic agents. Indeed, buyers and sellers follow simple behavioral rules and
heuristics and their interactions determine prices and segregation patterns without
the imposition of any aggregate constraint such as equilibrium. This is useful for
various reasons.
On the one hand, explicitly representing the functioning of the housing market
makes it possible to provide more realistic narratives than in spatial equilibrium
models for a variety of phenomena. Consider for example the mechanism that
segregates poor households out of the most attractive locations in a city, defined
as the places with highest density of amenities. In the spatial equilibrium model of
Brueckner et al. (1999), segregation occurs when the marginal valuation of amenities
rises sharply with income, so that high-income households are willing to bid more
than low-income households to reside in the place with most amenities.1 This means
that the rich value amenities more than the poor do. In our ABM rich and poor
households value amenities in the same way, but segregation is simply explained by
the bidding process and by the market dynamics – poor households would like to
live in the most attractive places, but as the prices go up they cannot afford it.
On the other hand, modeling the housing market as the outcome of decentralized
and unconstrained interactions makes it possible to fully consider various forms of
heterogeneity. In this paper we focus on income heterogeneity among the buyers to
study how income inequality shapes house prices and residential income segregation.
We show that higher income inequality worsens income segregation, but reduces the
average level of the prices. We also study how subsidies and taxes may foster social
1Brueckner et al. (1999) assume that this place is the center of the city.
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mixing, showing that these policies have different effects on distinct parts of the
income distribution. This reinforces the importance of heterogeneity in evaluating
the effectiveness of different policies.
The building blocks of our ABM are the behavioral rules for buyers and sellers
and the price formation mechanism. The buyers, who differ by income, have to
select among heterogeneous neighborhoods where they search for a dwelling. In-
stead of maximizing their expected utility, the buyers select a neighborhood with
a probability proportional to their utility, as in discrete choice theory (Anderson
et al., 1992).2 The sellers determine their reservation price – the minimum price
they are willing to accept – by employing an aspiration level heuristic. This means
that sellers try to apply a markup on the market price at the time when they
put their dwelling on sale, and progressively reduce their reservation price if their
sale is unsuccessful.3 Many models of the housing market assume that sellers act
optimally conditional on the distribution of offers by potential buyers (Anenberg,
2016). Here we follow instead the fast and frugal heuristics paradigm (Gigerenzer
and Todd, 1999) and assume that sellers employ a fixed selling rule, without an
explicit attempt to optimize profits (Artinger and Gigerenzer, 2016). Given that in
real housing markets information is limited and dispersed, using simple heuristics
may in fact be optimal (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). Finally, in our ABM buyers
and sellers are matched through a continuous double auction taking place in each
neighborhood at every time step. This represents bilateral bargaining in a stylized
way. The market price in each neighborhood is simply the average of the prices of
the transactions that occurred there.
We begin analyzing the model by finding an approximate analytical solution
of the ABM. Our strategy is to start from the simplest setting – e.g. all buyers
have the same income – and to increase the complexity of the model in a modular
way. We do not attempt at finding a general solution, which would be unfeasible,
but we provide insights in specific settings that are valid in the most complex
settings too. From a methodological point of view, this approach provides two main
contributions. First, we show that substantial simplifications can still capture some
important aspects of an ABM while allowing for mathematical tractability, as in
Gualdi et al. (2015). Second, the closed-form solutions provide insights that can be
used for calibration. For instance, some parameters only occur as a combination
(e.g. as a ratio of one parameter to the other), so it is sufficient to analyze the
effect of one parameter while holding the other fixed. In applied mathematics and
physics, these combinations are known as effective parameters.
We then simulate the ABM and focus on the relation between residential segre-
gation, income distribution of the buyers, house prices and policies. First, we find
that stronger income inequality leads to stronger residential segregation, in accor-
dance with empirical evidence (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011). To the best of our
knowledge, our model is the first to account for this empirical fact. Interestingly,
stronger income inequality also leads to lower average prices at the city level, as
empirically confirmed too. Ma¨a¨tta¨nen and Tervio¨ (2014) explain this stylized fact
by introducing a matching model with an optimal assignment rule between house-
holds acting as buyers and households acting as sellers. In our ABM, this finding
2Epple and Platt (1998) and Bayer et al. (2004) introduce discrete choice theory into spatial equilib-
rium models.
3This concept was first proposed by Simon (1955), and successively developed in search theory
(Wheaton, 1990; Genesove and Han, 2012; Han and Strange, 2015).
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is simply explained by the price formation mechanism. As income inequality in-
creases, fewer richer households bid higher, while the majority of households bid
lower. Because each buyer only bids for one dwelling and the market price at each
location is the average of all transaction prices, the global effect is negative.
Second, we find that a spike of demand in one part of the city increases the
prices all over the city. We model the rise of demand as an additional influx of
high-income households in the most attractive locations, mimicking the process
of rich “foreigners” trying to purchase properties in the city (Chinco and Mayer,
2015). The interpretation for this finding is as follows. An increase of the prices in
high-income neighborhoods implies that some of the households that would have
considered moving there move instead to low-income locations. This is due to a sub-
stitution effect with the non-housing consumption good that buyers also consider
in their utility function. Therefore, the prices increase at the least attractive loca-
tions too and the lowest-income households get segregated out of the city. Favilukis
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2017) come to the same conclusion within an overlapping
generations model, and this finding gets some empirical support from Cvijanovic
and Spaenjers (2018) and Sa´ (2016).
Third, we implement a system of ad-valorem taxes and subsidies on buyers, and
investigate which policy is most effective at fostering social mixing. Low-income
households receive subsidies, whereas high-income households have to pay a buyer
transaction tax. Effectively, these policies reduce the income spread between the
households, but the effect is different if they target the low-end or the high-end of the
income distribution. Subsidies directly target the low-income households and make
it possible for them to buy properties in previously not affordable neighborhoods.
Taxes on the contrary reduce the reservation prices of high-income households,
but have no significant effect on transaction prices because transaction prices are
still below the reservation prices of the rich. Note that in our model the only
transmission channel for taxes is through reducing the reservation prices. As we
assume inelastic global demand, taxes do not crowd out high-income households
(Dachis et al., 2011).4 We finally perform a welfare analysis of the different policies,
concluding that both subsidies and taxes increase the welfare of poor households
at the expense of the welfare of rich households. The change in social welfare is
negative if one considers a utilitarian welfare function, but it is positive according
to a Rawlsian welfare function (see e.g. Mas-Colell et al. 1995 for definitions of
these functions).
We conclude this introduction relating our model to other ABMs of the housing
market, and laying out a roadmap.
Relation to the literature on Agent-Based Models of the housing
market. With respect to the rest of the literature, we designed our ABM to be
parsimonious and tractable, yet with a sufficiently detailed description of the eco-
nomic forces that shape the housing market. This choice was in part to ensure some
mathematical tractability. However, we also wanted our agents to behave according
to simple heuristics, as this may be optimal in situations in which information is
limited and dispersed (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999), such as in housing markets.
4However, at least for the very top of the income distribution, demand is likely to be quite inelastic
if houses are purchased as a primary residence. Taxes could instead discourage investors and secondary
residence buyers.
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We start comparing our model to some of the earliest ABMs modeling housing
markets and income segregation. Feitosa et al. (2008) show how segregation can
emerge even if one considers the simplest setting with the minimal number of pa-
rameters. Jackson et al. (2008) also introduce a relatively simple model, focusing
on how the interaction between different classes of agents (“professionals”,“college
students”, “non-professionals”, and “elderly”) may lead to gentrification. The op-
posite end of the complexity spectrum is taken by Gilbert et al. (2009): They build
an ABM where some houses can be constructed, others are demolished, some agents
may put their apartment on sale because they lost their job, etc. The complexity
of our ABM is in between the contributions of Feitosa et al. (2008) and Jackson
et al. (2008) and that of Gilbert et al. (2009). Filatova et al. (2009) introduce
an ABM with a similar complexity to the model in the present paper, but they
assume that the reservation price of the sellers is just 25% more of the so-called
agricultural rent (Fujita, 1989). Our aim here is to represent the supply side in a
more detailed way. We mostly build on Gauvin et al. (2013), by which our model
shares many assumptions but differs substantially on the behavioral rules and the
market mechanism.
Ettema (2011) represents the supply side in a very detailed way. He assumes
that sellers calculate the probability to sell at each list price, and choose the op-
timal expected sale price taking into account the disutility of a delay in selling.
Moreover, sellers use Bayesian learning to update their perceived probabilities of
selling. As mentioned above, in our ABM we favor a simpler heuristic to determine
the list price. Magliocca et al. (2011) represent the formation of a city through the
interaction of land and housing markets. They highlight the importance of path
dependence in determining the shape of the city. In our ABM we start with an
existing city and focus on the long run prices and segregation patterns if the current
state of the city was to persist. In this situation we do not find that path depen-
dency plays a significant role. Delloye et al. (2015) also consider path dependency,
but the shape of the city is determined by the strength of agglomeration economies.
The ABMs in Delloye et al. (2015) and Lemoy et al. (2017) are specifically designed
to potentially reach the equilibrium of spatial equilibrium models (Fujita, 1989).
In our ABM we do not have this goal, and even when the system reaches a steady
state (punctuated by noise) this is not an equilibrium in the typical sense of urban
economics.
Huang et al. (2013) systematically study the effect of heterogeneity on the out-
comes of the ABM. They focus on two types of heterogeneity: income heterogeneity
and preference heterogeneity. In our ABM we also consider income heterogeneity.
Preference heterogeneity follows from different budget constraints among buyers,
but is not modeled explicitly by letting different agents have different parameters in
their utility function. Harting and Radi (2018) study the relation between income
heterogeneity and ethnic preferences, finding complex non-linear relations among
these variables. In particular, they find that subsidies may worsen segregation if
they alter the delicate balance between income and ethnic preferences. This effect
is absent in our model as we do not have ethnic preferences, and we find that sub-
sidies have the most positive effect on social mixing. It should also be noted that
the ABM of Harting and Radi (2018) is not spatially explicit, while our ABM is.
A final dimension in which our model relates to the rest of the literature is
the use of data to micro-calibrate the agents and the parameters. Geanakoplos
et al. (2012) and Baptista et al. (2016) use a wealth of microdata to calibrate
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non-spatial housing market ABMs and study implications on systemic risk, while
Filatova (2015) and Koning et al. (2017) introduce geographically detailed features
in their spatial ABMs through the inclusion of GIS information. Our goal here is
not to calibrate our model to a specific city or country, although we do calibrate
one parameter on real data as it is stable across different datasets (see Appendix
C).
Roadmap. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
the model; we then give an approximate mathematical description of it in Section
3, and provide results from the numerical simulations in Section 4. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Model
A schematic representation of the model is provided in Figure 1, and an ODD+D
(Grimm et al., 2010; Mu¨ller et al., 2013) description of the ABM is given in Ap-
pendix A. Our model considers an already formed city, mathematically defined as
a grid in the Cartesian plane. A specific point of the grid is a location. Space is
characterized by different levels of attractiveness, a variable subsuming exogenous
intrinsic features and endogenous social characteristics. Time is discrete. At each
time step:
1. Some households – the buyers – come to the city from outside and try to pur-
chase a dwelling in the metropolitan housing market. They select a location
with a probability proportional to their expected utility at that location.
2. Households already living in the city decide to put their dwelling on sale with a
certain probability. We refer to the households with a dwelling on the market
as “the sellers”.
3. The buyers have heterogeneous incomes and bid a certain amount in order to
secure a property. The bids are proportional to their income.
4. The sellers determine the price they ask by employing an aspiration level
heuristic.
5. At each location, buyers and sellers are matched through a continuous double
auction. The transaction price is a weighted average of the bid and ask prices.
The weight depends on the bargaining power.
6. Successful buyers take residence in the location where they searched and suc-
cessful sellers leave the city. The market price is computed at each location
as the average price of the transactions that occurred there.
The goal of this paper is to introduce a baseline ABM of the housing market,
in which realistic behavioral rules give rise to a variety of phenomena related to
income inequality and income segregation. Therefore we simplify many aspects of
the model, which is also necessary to keep the ABM partly analytically tractable.
While describing the model, we highlight a number of possible modifications that
would improve the realism of the ABM. Most importantly, in this paper we only
focus on steady states – our model describes what would happen to the spatial price
distribution and income segregation patterns in the long run, if the current state
of the city was to persist.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the model. The city is a grid of locations X = (x, y), with
center O, linear size L and distance a between locations. At each location there are N identical housing
units, and space is characterized by different levels of attractiveness. (The attractiveness evolves over time
according to the social composition of the neighborhood, in this schematic we show the attractiveness
at a particular time step.) At every time step, Γ buyers come to the city from the outside and current
inhabitants put their dwelling on sale with probability α. At each location and every time step, buyers
and sellers are matched through a continuous double auction, here visually depicted with discrete demand
and supply curves constructed from the reservation prices of the agents.
2.1 Space and time
The city is defined as a two-dimensional square grid Ω of locations X ∈ Z2, with
linear size L. The origin O is taken as the geographical center of the city, and
two neighboring locations are separated by a distance a. The same number N of
identical dwellings5 are available at each location X ∈ Ω. Time is discrete and
indexed by t. The time horizon is infinite.
All locations are characterized by an attractiveness A(X, t). This combines a
constant and exogenous intrinsic attractiveness A0(X) and an endogenous social
component AS(X, t). The intrinsic attractiveness quantifies the presence of natural
amenities, historic buildings, and the convenience of the transportation system at
that location.6 The social component quantifies the educational and labor oppor-
5Housing market segmentation can be important (Landvoigt et al., 2015; Piazzesi et al., 2017). More-
over, apartments are at least heterogeneous for what concerns their size. We experimented with het-
erogeneous size and only found a blurring of the segregation patterns. For instance, assuming that
with homogeneous size the rich are completely segregated in the center, with heterogenous size a few
low-income households afford to reside in the center in small apartments.
6The typical way to include transportation into urban economics models is through a cost that is
included in the budget constraint (Fujita, 1989). However, especially in European cities, transportation
costs are relatively small, and so we model the commuting time as a disutility – in particular as a
negative effect on the attractiveness. Gaigne´ et al. (2018) show that (within the traditional modeling
framework) amenities and commuting costs can be aggregated into a single quantity, which they name
the location-quality index.
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tunities that arise from living in that neighborhood (Benabou, 1993). These in
turn depend on the average income of the agents living in that neighborhood, so we
assume that AS(X, t) = Y (X, t)/Y (t), where Y (X, t) is the average income of the
agents living at location X at time t, and Y (t) is the average income of the agents
in the city at the same time step. We finally assume that the intrinsic and social
components combine multiplicatively, namely
A(X, t) = A0(X)AS(X, t). (1)
One remark is important here. For simplicity in this paper we only consider
a monocentric city where the intrinsic attractiveness A0(X) decreases with the
distance from the center (differently from Figure 1). As we will see, this creates
a positive feedback by which rich agents take residence in the center and further
increase the total attractiveness A(X, t) there through an increase of the social
component AS(X, t).7 This captures the idea of a city where most amenities and job
opportunities are concentrated in the center (Brueckner et al., 1999), also normally
called Central Business District (CBD) in urban economics (Fujita, 1989). By
tuning A0(X), our ABM trivially generalizes to cities with arbitrarily distributed
attractiveness – as in Figure 1 – including polycentric cities (Fujita and Ogawa,
1982; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002), cities where the rich choose to live in
the peripheries (Alonso, 1964), or cities with any other shape as studied in urban
geography and city planning (see e.g. Angel and Blei 2016).
2.2 Agents
The agents are households. At each time step t a constant number Γ of households
arrive on the market from outside the city and try to purchase one property. We
refer to these agents as “the buyers”. These households are only characterized by
their monthly income Y . For simplicity, we consider a finite number K of income
levels. Agents with the same income are denoted by k-agents, k ∈ {1, ...,K}, and
have income Yk. These incomes are ordered by increasing values, Y1 < Y2 < ... <
YK , and are separated by a constant ∆. We denote the number of incoming agents
in each income category by Γk, s.t.
∑
k Γk = Γ.
At the end of each time step, some of the buyers secure a property and take
residence in the city – we refer to these agents as “housed”. We assume that the
unsuccessful buyers leave the city and may come back with a subsequent cohort.
Indeed, it is not useful to keep track of the identities of the buyers, as these agents
are only characterized by their income.
At the beginning of each time step, households already living in the city may
put their dwelling on sale with a constant and homogeneous probability α. Housed
agents whose dwelling is on the market are denoted as “sellers”. The sum of buyers,
sellers and housed agents is constant and equal to Γ + NL2. At t = 0, all agents
in the city are housed. When t > 0, the relative proportion of housed and sellers
depends on the number of buyers Γ, on the sale probability α and on the market
outcomes.
In this model Γ and α are fixed, but it could be useful to make them depend
on the level of the prices in the city and on the timing with respect to the house
7Within our model the social component has a minor effect with respect to the intrinsic component.
See Section 4.1.
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price cycle. For instance, α could be larger if the prices are rising and smaller if
the prices are falling. However, being primarily concerned with income segregation,
we are mostly interested in the long-term trends and the relative prices between
several areas of the city, which are influenced more strongly by the attractiveness
than by the global demand or leave rate.
2.3 Demand
At each time step t, demand at each location X is determined by the individual deci-
sions of the buyers. The k-buyers have utility function Uk(X, t) = zk(t)
1−β (A(X, t))β,
where zk(t) represents the monthly non-housing consumption of k-agents at time
t. (A very similar utility function is very common in urban economics, see Fujita
1989.) The parameter β ∈ [0, 1] is the weight given to the attractiveness, which
exemplifies housing consumption. The budget constraint is
zk(t) + P (X, t) = Yk, (2)
where P (X, t) is the expected monthly mortgage repayment after purchasing a
property at location X and time t (the determination of P (X, t) will be explained
at the end of Section 2). We have also assumed unit cost for the non-housing
consumption good, which is the nume´raire of the economy. (This is a standard
modeling choice in urban economics.) The above equation does not assume savings.
If we wanted to include savings, we could just consider that the buyers spend a
fraction s of their income Yk, and redefine the incomes in the model as the part
that is not saved. Replacing the budget constraint in the utility function, we get
the indirect utility
Vk(X, t) =
{
(Yk − P (X, t))1−β (A(X, t))β , Yk > P (X, t),
0, Yk ≤ P (X, t).
(3)
In case Yk ≤ P (X, t) the k-agents cannot afford to purchase a property at location
X and time t, and so their utility would be 0. Note that this is not an indirect
utility function standard in microeconomics (see e.g. Mas-Colell et al. 1995). The
reason is that A(X, t) is not a good whose quantity to be purchased is determined
optimally, but rather a fixed quantity that is taken as given.
We consider a probabilistic model for the choice of residential location by the
buyers. The k-buyers choose location X at time t with probability pik(X, t), pro-
portional to the utility they expect to find at that location:
pik(X, t) = Vk(X, t)/
∑
X′∈Ω
Vk(X
′, t). (4)
This behavioral rule follows the literature on discrete choice theory (Anderson et al.,
1992), and captures the idea that the decisions of the buyers are noisy, although
not irrational.8
To sum up, the demand side of the market at location X and time t is char-
acterized by the number of k-buyers Nkb (X, t),∀k – determined stochastically from
8Typically, in discrete choice theory the probability pik(X, t) depends exponentially on the utility
Vk(X, t), with a sensitivity parameter – the intensity of choice – that quantifies the deviation from ratio-
nality. Here we choose a polynomial form of degree one, which is a more parsimonious parametrization.
9
Eq. (4) – and by their reservation demand price, which we simply assume to be a
multiple of their monthly income: P dk = ζYk. The reservation demand price is the
maximum amount the buyers are willing to bid. So they may potentially borrow
an amount ζYk from a bank, and repay it monthly in ζ installments. For clarity of
exposition, we will consider ζ = 1, but this is equivalent to normalizing all prices
to their monthly equivalent.
2.4 Supply
The dwellings available for sale at location X and time t are those that are put on
the market by the agents housed in X in the same time step plus, if any, those that
have not yet been sold on previous time steps. We denote the number of sellers as
Ns(X, t).
The reservation offer price is the minimum amount a seller is willing to accept
to sell his property. The sellers determine their reservation price by employing an
aspiration level heuristic. This concept was initially proposed by Simon (1955), who
in fact specifically considered the example of an individual trying to sell a dwelling.
The seller would accept any offer above a satisficing threshold, and adjust that
threshold downward if the sale was unsuccessful. Search theory has developed this
idea by endogenizing the threshold and the waiting time so to follow an optimal
stopping rule. A rich literature has applied this idea to model the time on market
of real-estate properties.
Most models in search theory assume that the sellers know the distribution
of offers by the potential buyers. In real housing markets information is limited
and dispersed, and in our model there is an inherent stochasticity due to the noisy
decisions of the buyers. Anenberg (2016) introduces a model in which sellers update
their reservation price using Bayesian learning on the received offers, so to behave
optimally given the available information. However, in uncertain environments
the use of simple heuristics in place of optimization can be optimal. Therefore,
following the fast and frugal heuristics paradigm proposed by Gigerenzer and Todd
(1999), we assume that the sellers employ a fixed selling rule, without an explicit
attempt to optimize profits. In particular, they try to apply a markup on the market
price, and progressively reduce their reservation price as their sale is unsuccessful.
Artinger and Gigerenzer (2016) show empirically that most sellers indeed follow
this behavioral rule, which yields more profits than equilibrium strategies.9
We follow Artinger and Gigerenzer (2016) in specifying the functional form of
the aspiration level heuristic. Sellers first attempt to sell at a higher price than
the market price, trying to apply a markup µ on the current market price. If the
sellers are unsuccessful in selling after τ time steps, they adjust their reservation
price downward by a factor λ. Here λ captures the “downward stickiness” typical
of housing market: when demand increases, prices rise quickly, but in situations of
excess supply prices decrease slowly. In formula, the reservation offer price P si (X, t)
for seller i at location X at time t is
P si (X, t) = (1 + µ)P (X, ti)λ
m, with mτ ≤ t− ti < (m+ 1)τ, (5)
where ti is the time step in which household i put their apartment on sale, and
t− ti is the time on market. The reservation price is decreased by a factor λ every
9The authors actually consider the used cars market and not the housing market, but the information
structure is quite similar in the two settings.
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multiple m of τ . Note that – differently from the case of the buyers – here we
need to keep track of the identities of all sellers i, as all reservation offer prices can
potentially be heterogeneous.10
2.5 Matching
Matching between buyers and sellers occurs at each location and each time step
through a continuous double auction, which we take as a stylized model of a bilat-
eral bargaining process. The reservation offer (demand) prices enter in a random
sequence as asks (bids) in a limit order book. Every time a bid price exceeds an
ask price, a transaction takes place and the two prices are removed from the order
book. This process continues until all agents have placed their orders.
The price of the transaction depends on bargaining, which we model in a stylized
fashion. In particular, we assume that the price of a transaction between a k-buyer
and seller i is a linear combination of the reservation prices,
Pki = νP
d
k + (1− ν)P si . (6)
Here ν quantifies the bargaining power of the seller. If ν = 0, the transaction price
is simply the reservation price of the seller – this parameterization would model a
situation in which the seller needs to post his reservation price – while if ν > 0 the
seller would post a higher price.
Finally, the market price P (X, t) is the average of all transaction prices that
were recorded at location X and time t.
3 Mathematical analysis
The goal of this section is to show that, in spite of the complexity of the ABM, some
of its features can be understood analytically, without the need to resort to numer-
ical simulations. Our analytical solution gives insights on the causal mechanisms of
the ABM and makes the effect of its parameters clearer. While our mathematical
analysis gives some insights into the determinants of segregation, the reader who is
mostly interested about the relation between segregation and income inequality and
in the effect of subsidies and taxes may skip this section and move to the numerical
simulations that follow in Section 4.
For our analysis we follow a modular strategy, in the sense that we progressively
focus on specific aspects of the ABM while neglecting other features in order to
maintain tractability. In particular, in Section 3.2 we assume that the agents only
value the attractiveness in their utility function (i.e. β = 1 in Eq. 3) and we
consider only one income category (i.e. K = 1). In Section 3.3 we relax the
assumption that β = 1, and focus on the tradeoff between non-housing consumption
10Here we do not assume heterogeneity in the parameters µ, λ and τ . We do so for various reasons. On
a practical note, we experimented with having these parameters drawn from a distribution and virtually
nothing changed at the aggregate level. As we aim to keep our model as parsimonious and tractable as
possible, it makes sense to just assume homogeneity of these parameters. On a theoretical note, Artinger
and Gigerenzer (2016) show in their Figure III (p. 25) that the distribution of these parameters (that
they call α, γ and β respectively) is rather peaked around the median values in the used cars market
they analyze, and we think that this may also apply in the housing market.
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and attractiveness. In Section 3.4 we consider two income categories (i.e. K = 2)
and study the conditions that imply income segregation.
In this section we only report the details necessary to understand the mathe-
matical analysis, while leaving some technical derivations to Appendix B.
3.1 Preliminary steps
The following simplifying assumptions are made for analytical tractability. These
simplifications are then relaxed in the numerical simulations.
First, we average out stochastic effects by taking expected values. For example,
although the number of buyers coming to each location X is given in the ABM
by a multinomial stochastic process with probabilities defined in Eq. (4), for the
mathematical analysis we assume that the number of buyers at X is the expected
value of the process.
Second, we assume continuous space by considering a vanishing distance between
locations, a → 0. This step requires an important technical attention. So far all
quantities were defined for each location X – e.g. the number of k-buyers at X was
Nkb (X, t). In order to take the continuum limit we cannot keep using this definition.
Indeed, when a→ 0 and L is fixed the number of locations (L/a) grows large, so for
example the number of k-buyers in any specific X would become vanishingly small
(for fixed total number of buyers Γ). We solve this technical issue by dividing all
quantities that are defined at the location level by the local area a2. These quantities
are now mathematically defined as densities, and we denote them by a lower-case
letter. For example the density of k-buyers at X and t is nkb (X, t) = N
k
b (X, t)/a
2.
When a → 0, also Nkb (X, t) → 0, and so the density is well defined in the limit.
The other variables we have to transform are Ns(X, t) → ns(X, t) = Ns(X, t)/a2
and N → n = N/a2, where n = n(X) is uniform for all X.
Third, we neglect the social component of the attractiveness, making the at-
tractiveness time independent: A(X, t) → A(X). This is exact in the case of one
income category, because all agents have the same income and so Y (X, t) = Y (t)
and A(X, t) = A0(X) (see Eq. 1).11 We further assume that the intrinsic compo-
nent of the attractiveness has circular symmetry and decreases with the distance r
from the center O (monocentric city), up to a radius Rmax that represents the bor-
ders of the city. Therefore, we can write the attractiveness as A(r), with A′(r) < 0.
A possible specification of A(r) is
A(r) =
{
e−
r2
R2 , 0 < r ≤ Rmax,
0, r > Rmax,
(7)
where R is a steepness parameter that quantifies how much the attractiveness is
concentrated in the center.12 If R is very small, only the center is very attractive
and the peripheries are not attractive; if R is large, the attractiveness is spread
evenly across the city. Rmax is chosen so that the areas of the discrete-space square
lattice Ω and its continuous-space circular approximation considered in Eq. (7) are
the same, that is piR2max = L
2. In order to emphasize that the results that follow
11We will also show that ignoring the social component is safe in the case of two income categories
too, at least within our mathematical analysis (see Section 3.4).
12Here R plays the same role as the intensity of choice in discrete choice models. This is another reason
why we choose the polynomial form in Eq. (4) instead of the more common logit form.
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do not depend on the specific form of the attractiveness in Eq. (7), we write in
general A(r), except when performing specific calculations.
Finally, we focus on the steady state of the model. As already mentioned, our
ABM determines the economic outcomes in the long run, if the current state of the
city was to persist. It then makes sense to consider time averages in the numerical
simulations, and we will show that these closely match the analytical steady states.
3.2 Baseline case
Here we only consider one income category. We also assume that the buyers only
value the attractiveness in their utility function (and so do not value the non-housing
consumption). We only sketch the derivation and discuss which assumptions are
made, while the full derivation is given in Appendix B.1.
Our first step is to compute the densities of buyers and sellers at any distance r
in the steady state. Calculating the density of buyers is trivial, as it only depends
on the attractiveness which is exogenous in the simplification considered in this
section. Calculating the density of sellers is instead tricky, because it depends
on how many dwellings have remained on sale from the previous time step. It is
possible to find a self-consistent expression for this density for locations at distance
r if one assumes that all buyers were successful in securing an apartment at the
same locations in the previous time step. As we will see, breaking of this condition
leads to inconsistencies and gives insights into the functioning of the model. The
second step of our derivation involves computing the reservation prices of buyers
and sellers. All buyers have the same reservation price – we are assuming only one
income category. We calculate the expected reservation price of the sellers given
the expected time it takes to sell a dwelling at a location at distance r. We finally
compute the market price as a weighted average of the reservation prices of buyers
and sellers.
The steady state market price P ?(r) at distance r reads
P ?(r) =
νY
(
n− 1−αα ΓA(r)Z − λ1/τ
(
n− Γα A(r)Z
))
(
n− 1−αα ΓA(r)Z − λ1/τ
(
n− Γα A(r)Z
))
− (1− ν)(1 + µ)ΓA(r)Z
, (8)
where Z = 2pi
∫ Rmax
0 rA(r)dr is a normalization factor. As mentioned above, this
expression is correct provided that all buyers are always successful in securing an
apartment, which in turn depends on two conditions being satisfied:
n?b(r)
n?s(r)
≤ 1 and P ?(r) < Y. (9)
The first condition means that there must be at most as many buyers as sellers; the
second conditions states that the market price must be smaller than the income of
the buyers. We now look at three limiting cases that are interesting in their own
right and in which the conditions (9) may or may not be satisfied. This also gives
insights on the mechanisms of the model.
Attractiveness. We consider the least attractive locations, in which almost
no buyers purchase any property. From Eq. (8), limA(r)/Z→0 P ?(r) = νY . The
reservation prices of the sellers drop to zero because the time on market grows to
infinity. So from Eq. (6) the market price is simply determined by the bargaining
13
parameter ν and by the reservation price of the buyers Y . The conditions (9) are
satisfied.
Tightness. We consider some attractive location in which the number of buy-
ers equals the number of sellers – in other words the demand tightness q? =
n?b/n
?
s = 1. We have limq?→1 P ?(r) = νY/ (1− (1 + µ)(1− ν)). The expression
for the market price simplifies considerably. However, it is possible to check that
νY/ (1− (1 + µ)(1− ν)) ≥ Y , which is inconsistent with the assumptions of the
model (sellers cannot bid more than their income Y ). This is easily explained in dy-
namical terms. Suppose that at time t the price is P < Y . The buyers bid Y , while
the sellers ask (1+µ)P . So the price at time t+1 is P ′ = νY +(1−ν)(1+µ)P > P .
The sellers immediately sell their property, so their reservation offer price has no
time to decrease, therefore a steady state cannot be reached as the market price
keeps increasing.
Stickiness. We now assume that the prices are extremely sticky, in the sense
that the discount factor of the sellers λ1/τ is close to unity. In the limit, limλ1/τ→1 P
?(r) =
νY/ (1− (1 + µ)(1− ν)). The outcome is the same as for q? → 1. Indeed, the dy-
namics are similar. Assume that the agents put their dwelling on sale at t, when
the price is P . At t′  t they still ask (1 +µ)P , and so the market price at r keeps
increasing and cannot reach a steady state. Note that in Eq. (8), λ and τ occur as
a combination of parameters, λ1/τ . They are effectively only one parameter, as it
is enough to vary one while holding the other fixed.
Given the above analysis, we impose the constraint that if P ?(r) > Y , we set
P ?(r) = Y . This constraint simply formalizes the idea that the buyers cannot bid
more than Y , and so the market price cannot be higher.
As can be seen in Fig. 2A, the mathematical results are in line with the nu-
merical simulations of the discrete-space and fully heterogeneous dynamics. The
prices are slightly overestimated by the mathematical analysis. This is because of
the order book dynamics. Sellers with a lower reservation price have higher chance
of selling, but this effect is not captured in our mathematical analysis as we assume
that all dwellings on the market at r are sold with the same probability.
3.3 General utility
In general, the utility function for k-buyers for choosing a location at distance r
from the center at time t is
Uk(r, t) = zk(t)
1−β (A(r))β , (10)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Since just the utility function is different from the previous sec-
tion, the analysis is similar. (The only technical difference is described in Appendix
B.2). As can be seen in Fig. 2B, for small values of β the prices are almost uniform
across the city, due to the substitution effect between housing and non-housing
consumption, whereas larger values of β increase the slope of the price gradient.
3.4 Two categories
Now we keep β = 1 and consider two income categories, K = 2. The income
levels of the agents are Y1 and Y2, with Y2 = Y1 + ∆. We denote the households
respectively as 1-agents and 2-agents – the poor and the rich respectively. We
study under which conditions the market mechanism implies income segregation.
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Figure 2: Analytical results with one income category. (A) Comparison between the analytical
solution (line) and the numerical simulations (dots), in the baseline case where β = 1. The analytical
prices are from Eq. (8), setting P ?(r) = Y near the center where the conditions (9) are not satisfied.
The numerical results (here and in all simulations that follow) are averaged over 100 time steps over all
locations at the same distance r, after an equilibration time of 50 time steps. We do not report standard
errors on the numerical results because our model is ergodic and gives virtually identical results for
different random seeds. (B) Effect of β ∈ [0, 1]. The prices are more uniform if β is small, i.e. the agents
substitute housing with non-housing consumption. The other parameters are specified in Appendix C.
Under the assumptions made in this section, the best way to determine this is to
check if there exists a completely segregated circle with center O and radius rs ∈
[0, Rmax], which is only inhabited by 2-agents. In this circle the steady state value
for the market price must be higher than the income level of the 1-agents, formally
P ?(r) > Y1, ∀r < rs. Since the circle is inhabited only by 2-agents, we can use the
one category result in Eq. (8) with Y = Y2 and Γ = Γ2. Rearranging the boundary
condition P ?(rs) = Y1, and considering the specific form of the attractiveness as in
Eq. (7), we can compute rs, the radius of the segregated region:
rs = R
√√√√√log Γ2
[
1
1+∆/Y1
(
1
α
(
1− α+ λ1/τ)+ (1 + µ)(1− ν))− να (1− α− λ1/τ)]
piR2
(
1− e−R2max/R2)n (1− λ1/τ) 1−ν−ν∆/Y11+∆/Y1 .
(11)
We can then study the effect of the parameters on rs. The radius of the segregated
region increases with the number of incoming high-income households Γ2, and with
the markup µ that the sellers try to apply. Indeed, Γ2 is only in the numerator and
multiplies the squared brackets, and µ is only in the numerator and provides a non-
negative contribution. On the contrary, the radius rs decreases with the number of
available apartments n – which is only in the denominator –, supporting the policy
that less regulatory constraints on constructions may alleviate income segregation.
The role of the other parameters cannot be immediately seen from Eq. (11), so in
Fig. 3 we plot the radius of the segregated region as a function of a few interesting
parameters.
In Fig. 3A we consider R, the scale factor of the exponential in Eq. (7) that
quantifies how evenly spread is the attractiveness. Interestingly, as R increases
there is a non-monotonic effect. When R is small (up to R = 3 in Fig. 3A), all
2-buyers want to reside in the center and this keeps the prices above the income
level Y1 of the 1-agents. The radius rs grows with R, because the 2-buyers spread
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Figure 3: Size of the segregated region as a function of some parameters. We plot the radius
of the segregated region rs (Eq. 11) against three parameters. We compare the analytical results (lines)
with numerical results (dots). In the numerical approximation we cannot have total segregation because
of stochastic effects, so we define rs as the first distance at which the share of 2-agents is smaller than
95%. (Note that in the numerical simulations rs takes only a finite number of values.) (A) R quantifies
how evenly spread is the attractiveness. (B) ∆/Y1 is the relative spread of the income levels. (C) λ
1/τ
is the stickiness of the prices. The other parameters are specified in Appendix C.
in a larger region. But after a turning point, rs starts decreasing, because the 2-
buyers spread more and more evenly and are not numerous enough at any specific
location to keep the prices above Y1. This result is in line with Gaigne´ et al. (2018),
who find that a multimodal distribution of amenities may foster social mixing. In
Fig. 3B we look at ∆/Y1, that quantifies the relative spread of income levels.
These parameters always occur as a ratio of one another, suggesting that they can
be treated as a unique parameter. A larger ∆/Y1 slightly increases segregation,
almost in a linear fashion. Finally, in Fig. 3C we show that more stickiness leads
to more segregation. There is an asymptote at λ1/τ → 1, in which the reservation
offer prices never decrease, as discussed in Section 3.2.
In all the cases above analytical results match numerical results well, indicating
that in this case it is safe ignoring the social component of the attractiveness (the
segregated region is only inhabited by 2-agents).
4 Numerical simulations
In this section we perform some numerical simulations of the fully-fledged ABM
to analyze the effect of the income distribution and of subsidies and taxes on the
prices and segregation patterns. We consider ten income categories, K = 10, and
we assume that the agents face a tradeoff between housing and non-housing con-
sumption (β = 0.5). The other values for the baseline parameters are discussed in
Appendix C. We set some parameters following guidance from the mathematical
analysis, and set other parameters to empirically reasonable values.
The cost of considering a more realistic setting is that no analytical solution
is possible. To ensure full reproducibility, the code used to generate all figures is
available at https://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1453347.
4.1 Dynamics of the Agent-Based Model
We perform our analysis by averaging variables over time. Indeed, as already
mentioned we are interested in long-term trends and segregation patterns, so it
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Figure 4: Dynamics of the Agent-Based Model. We plot some variables over time at three locations
representative of the city. X = (0, 0) is the center (dashed lines), X = (4, 4) is in the periphery (dotted
lines), X = (2, 2) is in between (solid lines). We only show one simulation run, but the time series are
qualitatively similar for other random seeds. Here Y1 = 30 and ∆ = 11.86, the other parameters are
specified in Appendix C. (A) The market price quickly reaches a steady state punctuated by noise. (B)
The attractiveness A(X, t) also reaches a similar state. At X = (0, 0) and (2, 2) (left scale on the vertical
axis) it increases from the initial intrinsic value A0(X), whereas at X = (4, 4) (right scale) it decreases.
(C) Number of agents with k = 3 (poorest), k = 5 and k = 8 (richest) at the three locations.
makes sense to ignore high-frequency fluctuations. Moreover, in this section we
show that at least some variables quickly reach a steady state punctuated by noise.
Other variables display larger fluctuations but these are mostly driven by noise.
The lack of economically meaningful endogenous dynamics in our model further
justifies taking time averages.
In Figure 4A we show the time evolution of the market price at three locations.
At X = (0, 0) and X = (2, 2) the market price reaches a relatively stable value
after about 25 time steps, after which the fluctuations are typically around 5 price
units. The market price at X = (4, 4) reaches a similar state, but the transient is
longer, of the order of 75 time steps. Unsurprisingly, the market price is highest in
the center, where the attractiveness is maximal, and decreases moving farther from
the center.
The dynamics of the attractiveness is shown in panel B of the same figure. At
initialization (t = 0), the agents are allocated randomly across the city, irrespective
of their income category. Therefore, up to noise the average income Y (X, 0) at
any location X is equal to the average income over the city Y (0). This means
that the social component of the attractiveness is (up to noise) AS(X, t) = 1,
so at initialization the attractiveness A(X, t) approximately corresponds to the
intrinsic component, A(X, 0) ≈ A0(X). As the social composition of neighborhoods
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changes over time, so does the attractiveness. At X = (0, 0) it raises steadily from
A(X, 0) = 1 to A(X, t > 50) ≈ 1.4, while at X = (2, 2) the attractiveness also rises
but by a smaller amount. In both locations the increase of A(X, t) is explained
by the share of (relatively) rich agents increasing over time, creating a positive
feedback that further increases the share of rich agents. The opposite mechanism
is at play at X = (4, 4), where the share of rich agents decreases over time. (Note
that because A0(X = (4, 4)) is two orders of magnitude smaller than at X = (0, 0),
for visualization purposes we show the attractiveness at X = (4, 4) on the right
scale of the vertical axis.) In all cases, the social attractiveness quantitatively plays
a minor role with respect to the intrinsic attractiveness.
A more detailed representation of the evolution of the social composition of
neighborhoods is given in Figure 4C. We show the number of agents whose status
is either housed or seller and belonging to three income categories, in the same three
locations as above. At X = (0, 0) the poorest of the three categories (3-agents, in
red) disappears after 50 time steps, because the market price becomes larger than
their income Y3. The number of agents belonging to the two other categories (5-
agents, in cyan, and 8-agents, in green) instead fluctuates over time. These numbers
also fluctuate at X = (2, 2) and X = (4, 4), with the share of 3-agents increasing
as one moves farther from the center.
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Figure 5: Spatial distribution of k-agents as a function of the distance from the center. The
parameter values are the same as in Fig. 4. The number of k -agents is averaged over 100 time steps over
all locations at the same distance from the center.
Finally, in Figure 5 we show the time-averaged shares of k-agents as a function
of the distance from the center. (We consider a transient of 50 time steps, and then
average from time step 51 to time step 150.) This figure shows that the categories
with lowest income (k = 1–3) are segregated out of the center, while agents from
the other categories are mostly located up to distance r = 4. However, the shares of
k-buyers (k > 3) at locations r < 4 are not proportional to the population shares.
For example, at r = 0 the share of 10-agents is roughly 1/3 of the share of 4-agents,
but in the population of buyers Γ10/Γ4 = 1/5 (see Appendix C), so 10-agents are
over-represented in the center. This is caused by the continuous double auction:
although the market price is below the reservation price of 4-buyers, 10-buyers bid
higher and are matched first. Because in the very center demand largely exceeds
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supply, 10-agents are more likely to secure an apartment.13
4.2 Effect of the income distribution
We now study the effect of the income distribution of the buyers on the prices
and segregation patterns. We consider twelve income distributions, with increasing
levels of inequality. We keep the shares of k-buyers Γk/Γ fixed, and vary instead the
minimum income Y1 and the total income spread ∆. Indeed, buyers categories are
arbitrarily defined, and it is the relative income spread ∆/Y1 that determines the
level of inequality (see below). The important constraint is that the total income of
the buyers must be the same across income distributions to allow for a meaningful
comparison.
The total income of the buyers is
M =
K∑
k=1
YkΓk = Y1Γ + ∆
K∑
k=2
(k − 1)Γk = Γ
[
Y1 + ∆
K∑
k=2
(k − 1)Γk/Γ
]
. (12)
In order to quantify income inequality, we take one of the possible definitions of the
Gini index, namely half the relative absolute mean difference of incomes (Cowell,
2000). With the discrete distribution we consider, the Gini index reads
G =
∑K
k=1 Γk
∑K
j=1 ∆|k − j|Γj
2ΓM
. (13)
We keep M = 60Γ and fix the shares of k-buyers to {Γk/Γ} = (0.25, 0.20, 0.15, 0.10,
0.08, 0.07, 0.06, 0.04, 0.03, 0.02). We then vary ∆ and Y1 to obtain twelve different
income distributions, whose Gini coefficients range from G = 0.26 to G = 0.48.
For example, the most equal income distribution (G = 0.26) is characterized by
Y1 = 30 and ∆ = 11.86, so the relative income spread is only ∆/Y1 = 0.4 and
the income of the richest buyers is larger by a factor of 4.5 than the income of the
poorest. Conversely, the most unequal income distribution (G = 0.48) has Y1 = 5
and ∆ = 21.74, so ∆/Y1 = 4.35 and the richest buyers have 40 times the income of
the poorest. All values of ∆, Y1 and G are specified in Appendix C.
It is not meaningful to compare different income distributions by considering
the spatial distribution of the shares of k-agents (as in Figure 5). Indeed, these
categories are arbitrarily defined and we need to measure segregation in a way that
is independent of the level of inequality. Therefore we resort to a rank-order in-
formation theory index (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011) which only uses information
about the rank ordering of incomes, and is thus independent of the income distribu-
tion. We denote income percentile ranks by p ∈ [0, 1]. For any given value of p, we
calculate the segregation over the city between households with income ranks less
than p and households with income ranks greater or equal to p. We then average
over all values of p. More specifically, denote by
E(p) = −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) (14)
13The over-representation is also partly caused by a substitution effect: 4-buyers would spend most of
their income to live at r = 0, so they prefer neighborhoods farther from the center where they can afford
a higher level of non-housing consumption.
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Figure 6: Effect of the income distribution on segregation and prices. (A) Rank-order informa-
tion theory segregation index HR (Eq. 16) as a function of the Gini Index (Eq. 13). Higher inequality
leads to more segregation, in accordance with empirical evidence. (B) Average market price for the most
equal and most unequal income distributions, and with an additional influx of rich buyers who search
for an apartment only in the center. In the latter case, the prices increase all over the city and not only
in the center. Globally, the prices are lower if the income distribution is unequal.
the information entropy of the population when divided into these two groups, and
by
H(p) = 1− 1
L2
∑
X∈Ω
EX(p)
E(p)
(15)
the Theil index of segregation in the population divided between these two groups,
where EX(p) is the information entropy calculated at location X. The rank-order
information theory index HR is then
HR = 2 ln 2
∫ 1
0
E(p)H(p)dp (16)
This quantity varies between a minimum of zero, which corresponds to complete
lack of segregation (the income distribution in each location X mirrors the global
income distribution, so that EX(p) = E(p), ∀X ∈ Ω), and a maximum of one
with complete income segregation (in every location all households have the same
income).
In Figure 6A we show how the segregation index HR varies with the level of
inequality, as measured by the Gini index. We see that segregation increases with
inequality, most strongly for G < 0.38. There is little empirical evidence on the
effect of income inequality on income segregation, because spatial income data are
rarely available. Most studies (Wheeler and La Jeunesse, 2008; Watson, 2009;
Reardon and Bischoff, 2011) rely on U.S. census data, because binned income dis-
tributions (with 15-25 bins) are available for each census tract. These studies find
that income inequality increases income segregation, in accordance with our model.
Reardon and Bischoff (2011) attribute this result to income-correlated social pref-
erences, or to higher provision of local public goods in neighborhoods where the
rich live (Tiebout, 1956). Here we show that our ABM can replicate this finding.
We look at the spatial distribution of prices in Figure 6B. Comparing the most
unequal and the most equal income distributions, in the unequal case the prices are
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higher in center and lower in the peripheries. Indeed, in the outskirts the share of
lowest-income households is larger if the income distribution is unequal, reducing
the prices. Because most agents reside in the locations where the prices go down,
the global effect on prices is negative (-4%). This result is in line with Ma¨a¨tta¨nen
and Tervio¨ (2014), who come to the same conclusion using an assignment model
that determines an equilibrium price gradient. The authors also show that this
finding is supported empirically in a number of U.S. cities. Using their model, they
perform a counterfactual exercise and calculate what the prices would be if the
level of inequality had not increased. They find values between 0 and 10% higher
according to the specific metropolitan area, in quantitative accordance with our
model.
We also experiment with an additional influx of rich agents in the center, testing
whether the prices only grow in this location or whether they increase all over the
city. We mimic the process by which rich households coming from outside – the
“foreigners” – purchase real-estate properties in a city, either as a luxury good or
as a secondary residence (Cvijanovic and Spaenjers, 2018).14 These buyers usually
choose the most attractive locations, and distort the local housing market because
of their disproportionately high reservation prices (Chinco and Mayer, 2015).
We assume that Γ/10 “foreigners” try to purchase a property at any time step
t > 0 with uniform probability in all locations within a radius r = 3 from the origin
O, i.e. ∀X = (x, y) ∈ Z2 s.t. x2 + y2 ≤ 9. We impose this hard threshold because
we will assess whether prices and segregation patterns change all over the city and
not just in the center. Therefore, we need to exclude the trivial scenario in which
foreigners directly affect these variables by searching all over the city. The income
of the foreigners is YK+∆, that is larger by a factor of ∆ than the income of the K-
agents. Other than that, the foreigners participate to the housing market following
the same protocol as the other agents, e.g. they are not necessarily matched first
in the order book.
We consider the most equal income distribution as a benchmark (but the results
are robust to the choice of the distribution). Figure 6B shows that the prices
increase substantially in the area where the foreigners search, but also all over
the city, especially in the peripheries. The arrival of foreigners in the center leads
to price growth in the most attractive locations. In turn, the increase in prices
makes these locations less appealing to high-income households. Indeed, recall
from Section 2.3 that households also value non-housing consumption, and so are
willing to substitute the attractiveness for cheaper locations where they can afford
a higher consumption level. As the high-income households move to less attractive
locations, their bids push up the prices there as well. So middle-income households
may decide to search in the least attractive locations, and the process cascades all
over the city in the steady state. This implies that 1-agents (the poorest buyers)
cannot afford buying properties even in the peripheries and are segregated out of
the city, differently from the benchmark case without additional influx in Figure 5.
(This is not shown explicitly here but can be checked in the replication files.)
These conclusions are supported by indirect empirical evidence. For example,
Cvijanovic and Spaenjers (2018) analyze the purchases of foreigners in the Paris
14Another important category of wealthy external buyers is investors, who are mostly driven by in-
terest and exchange rates and by home market conditions (Cvijanovic and Spaenjers, 2018). As already
mentioned, in this paper we focus on long-term outcomes. Because investor dynamics is highly volatile
we do not think of agents composing the additional influx of buyers as investors.
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housing market and show that foreigners crowd out residents, overpay and cause
prices to increase in the most attractive locations. Sa´ (2016) finds that foreign
investment in England and Wales has a positive causal effect on house price growth
at different percentiles of the distribution, but she does not consider the spatial
aspect. From a theoretical point of view, Favilukis and Van Nieuwerburgh (2017)
come to our same conclusions. They use an overlapping generations model in which
heterogeneous households decide consumption, savings, labor supply, tenure status,
and location. In equilibrium, the households anticipate the arrival of the foreigners
(out-of-town home buyers), and adjust their decisions accordingly.
4.3 Effect of subsidies and taxes
We investigate which policy is most effective at reducing income segregation and
increasing social welfare. Housing market policies have traditionally been divided
in two strands.
First, subsidized housing aims at improving the accessibility of low-income
households to the housing market. There are two types of subsidies – project-
based and tenant or buyer-based (Sinai and Waldfogel, 2005). The former include
public housing and subsidies to the construction sector, which is incentivized to con-
struct new affordable houses. The latter include buyer-based vouchers, certificates,
rent supplements etc. There is a strong consensus in the literature for buyer-based
subsidies (Olsen, 2003), and so we focus on this policy (also, we do not consider
constructions in our model).
Second, transaction taxes increase the cost of transacting a dwelling. To avoid
paying the tax, many households may postpone buying or selling a dwelling (Dachis
et al., 2011), or adjust the transaction price to exploit discontinuities in tax liability
(Best and Kleven, 2017). For our purposes, transaction taxes are also aimed at
“cooling” the housing market and therefore improve affordability for low-income
households, as confirmed by the recent 15% transaction tax on foreign purchases in
Vancouver.15 Transaction taxes can be on buyers (in the form of stamp duty taxes)
or on sellers (capital gains tax). We focus here on transaction taxes on buyers, which
are widespread in OECD countries (Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn, 2005).
We implement a system of ad-valorem taxes and subsidies on buyers in a stylized
fashion. We denote by ξk the tax or subsidy for k-agents, where ξk > 0 indicates
a tax, and ξk < 0 denotes a subsidy. For example, a 10% subsidy corresponds to
ξk = −0.1, and a 10% tax to ξk = 0.1. The budget constraint of the buyers becomes
zk(t)+(1+ξk)P (X, t) = Yk. Replacing the budget constraint in the utility function,
we get the indirect utility
V ξk (X, t) = (Yk − (1 + ξk)P (X, t))1−β (A(X, t))β . (17)
The reservation demand prices are also affected by the tax or subsidy, with P dk =
Yk/(1 + ξk). For instance, with a 10% subsidy, the purchasing power of agents
with income Y = 15 rises to Y/0.9 = 16.7. On the contrary, with a 10% tax, the
purchasing power of agents with the same income reduces to Y1/1.1 = 13.6.
We analyze the effect of three policies on the prices and segregation patterns,
and compare with the no policy benchmark. The magnitude of subsidies and taxes
15See https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/taxes/property-taxes/
property-transfer-tax/understand/additional-property-transfer-tax.
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Figure 7: Effect of subsidies and taxes on segregation and prices. (A) Segregation (as quantified
by the rank-order information theory index HR) as a function of the level of inequality for the various
policies. The no policy benchmark corresponds to Figure 6A. (B) Average market price as a function of
the distance from the center for various policies and in the case of the most equal income distribution
(the no policy benchmark corresponds to the price shown in Figure 6B for G = 0.26).
should not be taken literally, as we are interested in qualitative differences and are
not calibrating the model against real data. The policies are:
• Subsidies only: ξS = (−0.20,−0.15,−0.10,−0.05, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00,
0.00). 1-agents receive a 20% subsidy, 2-agents receive a 15% subsidy, etc.
• Taxes only: ξT = (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20). We
implement an income-dependent transaction tax, with 10-agents paying 20%
of the transaction price, 9-agents paying 15%, etc.
• Subsidies and taxes: ξST = (−0.20,−0.15,−0.10,−0.05, 0.00, 0.00, 0.05, 0.10,
0.15, 0.20). We combine the systems of taxes and subsidies. With this policy
subsidies are funded through transaction taxes.
Figure 7 illustrates the results of our policy exercise. In Figure 7A we see that
taxes have a very small effect in mitigating income segregation, whereas subsidies
are more effective (and if used in combination with taxes yield the lowest segrega-
tion). The effect of policies is more pronounced if the level of income inequality is
not too high.
Figure 7B shows the average market price for the various policies. In this model,
taxes are not successful at decreasing the prices. There are at least two reasons for
this. First, the reservation prices of the richest buyers – who are the ones mostly
affected by the taxes – are still above the market price at any location, so the rich-
est buyers do not pay a fundamentally different price. Second, because the global
demand Γ is assumed inelastic, taxes cannot crowd out rich buyers. Figure 7B also
shows that subsidies increase the market price. However, the rise is included be-
tween 4 and 6 price units, whereas the growth in purchasing power that the subsidies
entail for the lowest-income households is 7.5 price units (Y1/ξ1 = 30/0.8 = 37.5).
So subsidies make it possible for these households to afford properties in locations
which they could not afford without the policy.
So far we have only compared the different policies based on the effect they have
on the segregation index HR and on the market prices. We conclude this section
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Figure 8: Welfare effects of subsidies and taxes. The Compensating Variation (CV) is the amount
of money that an agent should receive to maintain the same utility level after the introduction of the
policy. Therefore, a positive CV is associated with a decrease in utility, while the opposite is true when
the CV is negative. The CV subsumes the different channels through which the policies impact the
welfare of the agents (see Eq. (19)), but it does not consider the long-term benefits of social mixing. All
policies increase the welfare of the agents with lowest income categories, at the cost of decreasing the
welfare of richer agents.
by performing a welfare analysis of these policies. By changing the prices and
the social composition of neighborhoods, these policies impact the utility functions
of all agents. The compensating variation CV ξk (X) for k-agents at location X
due to the introduction of policy ξ is the amount of money that the same agents
would need to receive to return to the original utility level (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Denoting V 0k (Yk, P (X), A(X)) as the indirect utility for k-agents at X without the
introduction of the policy, the compensating variation is defined by
V 0k (Yk, P (X), A(X)) = V
ξ
k
(
Y ξk + CV
ξ
k (X), P
ξ(X), Aξ(X)
)
, (18)
where V ξk , Y
ξ
k , P
ξ(X) and Aξ(X) denote the same variables with the introduction
of the policy. Note that the prices, the attractiveness and also potentially the
compensating variation should also depend on time. As we take time averages, to
simplify the notation we drop the time dependence.
Solving Eq. (18) for CV ξk (X) using the usual form of the utility function and
the usual specification of subsidies and taxes (see Eq. (17)) yields
CV ξk (X) = ξkP
ξ(X) +
(
P ξ(X)− P (X)
)
+ (Yk − P (X))
( Y (X)
Y
ξ
(X)
) β
1−β
− 1
 .
(19)
The three terms on the right hand side of the expression above clarify the
channels through which the different policies impact the welfare of the agents. The
first term is the amount of money necessary to compensate the increase (decrease)
in purchasing power that the subsidy (tax) entails. Indeed, when ξk > 0 (tax),
this term is positive, while when ξk < 0 this term is negative (the agent’s utility
increases, so the agent should give money and not receive money to keep the same
level of utility). The second term is the difference in prices. When the prices
increase, due to the introduction of the policy, P ξ(X)−P (X) is positive and agents
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need to receive money to keep the same level of utility. If the prices decrease
because of the policy the opposite if true. Finally, the third term is positive if
Y (X)/Y
ξ
(X) > 1, i.e. if the policy reduces the average income at location X. This
implies a reduction in utility through the social component. An increase in average
income would instead increase utility and thus lead to a negative contribution in
the compensating variation.
One thing that CV ξk (X) does not capture is the long-term benefits of social
mixing (Benabou, 1993). Indeed, we do not have a labor market or an educational
system in our model, and the social composition of neighborhoods only enters utility
through the average income. Therefore, we should expect that the compensating
variation is overestimated in our analysis, i.e. the decrease in welfare due to the
various policies does not take into account the long-term increase in welfare due to
a better functioning labor market and educational system.
In Figure 8 we show the compensating variation CV ξk =
∑
X CV
ξ
k (X)/L
2, av-
eraged over all locations X, for k-agents for policy ξ. In all cases this quantity is
negative for agents belonging to the lowest income categories and positive for all
other agents, suggesting that only the welfare of the poorest agents improves. A
utilitarian social welfare function assumes that social welfare is just the sum of the
welfare of all agents: SW ξU =
∑
k ΓkCV
ξ
k /Γ. From a utilitarian point of view, the
global welfare would decrease due to the introduction of the various policies. Ac-
cording to a Rawlsian welfare function SW ξR = mink CV
ξ
k instead the global welfare
improves, because the poorest agents are increasing their welfare.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a baseline Agent-Based Model (ABM) of the
housing market. Our goal was to better understand the relation between segre-
gation and income inequality, house prices and policies by explicitly representing
the behavior of buyers and sellers and the market dynamics. In our model, the
behavioral rules rely on discrete choice theory and on the fast and frugal heuristics
paradigm, and the price formation mechanism is represented using a continuous
double auction. We need not impose any equilibrium restriction (such as finding
the conditions for which all agents have the same utility, as in spatial equilibrium
models) because in the ABM methodology outcomes are the result of unconstrained
interactions among agents.
We have found a partial analytical solution of the ABM. From a methodologi-
cal point of view, this shows that ABMs are not incompatible with mathematical
analyses, and that equilibrium and rationality are not simplifying assumptions nec-
essary for mathematical tractability. Our analytical solution makes it possible to
analyze the structure of the model and the effect of the parameters. For instance,
a closed-form solution shows that increasing the number of apartments available in
a city reduces income segregation.
We have simulated the model to study the interplay between the income distri-
bution of the buyers and the spatial price distribution, with a focus on the segrega-
tion patterns. We have then analyzed the global effect of a demand spike localized
in the center, and we have compared a number of policies whose goal is to foster
social mixing. Some of our results are in line with other findings in the literature,
but our modeling methodology allows for a simpler narrative that directly matches
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the housing market dynamics. Other results account for previously unexplained
empirical facts. For example, we are not aware of any theoretical contribution that
reproduces the positive causal link from income inequality to income segregation.
Our model can be extended in several ways, depending on the research question.
Because of the enhanced flexibility implied by the lack of equilibrium constraints,
it is extremely easy to add more realistic features (at least in the numerical sim-
ulations). For example, we may endogenize the global demand and the leaving
rate. Coupled with a role for expectations, this is likely to generate price cycles
in the city. We can also endogenize the intrinsic attractiveness, e.g. to consider
agglomeration effects. We can finally model mortgages and a financial sector, so to
investigate whether there is any implication of segregation on financial stability.
More importantly, this paper has served as a qualitative demonstration that a
disaggregated agent-based representation of the housing market can account for a
wide range of both well-known and less obvious phenomena related to income seg-
regation. The next step to show that ABMs may be a more faithful representation
of real housing markets (than e.g. spatial equilibrium or assignment models) would
be to show that ABMs better predict prices and segregation patterns quantitatively
and out of sample. Some works (Filatova, 2015; Baptista et al., 2016) are starting
to bring housing ABMs to data, but much more work is necessary in this direction.
A ODD+D description of the Agent-Based
Model
Having a standard for describing Agent-Based Models (ABMs) makes comparisons
across ABMs easier and helps researchers describe their models more clearly. To this
end, Grimm et al. (2010) proposed a protocol named Overview, Design Concepts
and Details (ODD), which was supplemented by Mu¨ller et al. (2013) to include
human Decision making (hence the protocol got named ODD+D). In this appendix
we describe our ABM following the ODD+D protocol.
A.1 Overview
A.1.1 Purpose
In this paper we introduce an ABM of the housing market. The purpose of our ABM
is to understand phenomena related to income inequality and income segregation
and to study the effects of policies designed to tackle these. An ABM is well-suited
to this goal because it makes it easy to fully consider heterogeneity by modeling
the market in a decentralized way without imposing aggregate constraints such as
equilibrium.
A.1.2 Entities, state variables and scales
The agents in our model are households. They are mainly characterized by their
state: they can be buyers, sellers, or housed if they are neither buying nor selling.
Agents are also characterized by their income. The exogenous driving factor of our
model is the structure of the city, here represented by an intrinsic attractiveness
that subsumes amenities and the convenience of the transportation system. This
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exogenous factor is supplemented by an endogenous social component that depends
on the social composition of neighborhoods. Space is a grid of fixed size with a finite
number of locations. Time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite.
A.1.3 Process overview and scheduling
At the beginning of each time step buyers come to the city from the outside and
select a location in which they will search for a dwelling. At the same time, housed
agents may decide to put their dwelling on sale with a certain probability, and join
the set of sellers at the same location. Next, at each location transactions take
place mediated by a continuous double auction. Finally, successful buyers take
residence in the location where they searched, successful sellers leave the city and
the updated market price is computed.
A.2 Design Concepts
A.2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Background
Our ABM builds on a substantial body of work on ABMs of the housing market, and
most of our assumptions are drawn from the existing literature (see the literature
review in the Introduction). With respect to many ABMs in this literature, we
designed our model to be parsimonious and tractable. The choice of the behavioral
rules is based on the fast and frugal heuristics paradigm (Gigerenzer and Todd,
1999). This suggests that in environments in which information is limited and
dispersed using simple heuristics may be optimal.
A.2.2 Individual Decision-Making
Buyers select a location where they could search for a dwelling based on the expected
utility at that location. However, instead of maximizing their expected utility, they
choose a location with a probability proportional to the utility, in the same spirit
as in discrete choice theory. Sellers employ an aspiration level heuristic, by which
they try to apply a markup on the current market price and reduce their requested
price successively if they fail to sell their dwelling.
A.2.3 Learning
No learning takes place.
A.2.4 Individual Sensing
Buyers are expected to know the market price and the attractiveness in each lo-
cation, further to their own income. The fact that they choose a location with a
probability proportional to the expected utility at that location may include im-
perfect measurement of the characteristics of a location – buyers may fail to choose
the optimal location because they may have limited information. Sellers only need
to know the market price of the location where they live at the time in which they
put their dwelling on sale.
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A.2.5 Individual Prediction
The agents do not predict future conditions. Expectations would be particularly
important in case of speculation, but this is not our focus here.
A.2.6 Interaction
Interactions between buyers and sellers are mediated by a continuous double auc-
tion. This is meant to represent bilateral bargaining between two groups in a
stylized fashion.
A.2.7 Collectives
There are no collectives in this model.
A.2.8 Heterogeneity
Buyers are heterogeneous for what concerns their income. This impacts their deci-
sion making because poor households will not attempt at purchasing properties in
expensive neighborhoods. Sellers are heterogeneous for what concerns their reser-
vation price – sellers whose dwelling has been on the market for a long period will
accept a lower reservation price.
A.2.9 Stochasticity
Initialization is completely random, but the model is ergodic so initialization does
not matter. Buyers search among locations in a stochastic manner.
A.2.10 Observation
We let the model run for an initial transient and then take measurements when it
has reached the steady state. We mostly measure prices and the number of agents
who fall in distinct income categories in each location.
A.3 Details
A.3.1 Implementation Details
The model has been implemented in NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999). The NetLogo code
and the R code that runs the model through the RNetLogo interface (Thiele et al.,
2012) are available on Zenodo: https://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1453347.
A.3.2 Initialisation
All locations are initialized with a price that is below the minimum reservation
price of the buyers. Buyers with different incomes are allocated randomly at ini-
tialization.
A.3.3 Input Data
The model does not take data from external sources.
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A.3.4 Submodels
For more details, we refer the reader to the code, and to Appendix C for the
parameter values and rationale for choosing those values.
B Mathematical derivations
B.1 Derivation of the market price in the one category
case
We proceed in three steps. First, we calculate the densities of buyers and sellers
at any distance r, in the steady state. Second, we compute the average reservation
demand and offer prices. Third, we obtain the market price.
We start calculating the expected steady state densities of buyers and sellers at
distance r. We denote them by n?b(r) and n
?
s(r) respectively. The density of buyers
is obtained multiplying the number of buyers Γ by the probability density to choose
a location at r (Eq. 4), given by the attractiveness A(r) and by a normalization
factor Z:
n?b(r) = ΓA(r)/Z, with Z = 2pi
∫ Rmax
0
rA(r)dr. (20)
The density of sellers ns(r, t) can be computed by summing the density of apart-
ments already on sale, denoted by n¯s(r, t), and the expected fraction of apartments
newly put on sale: ns(r, t) = n¯s(r, t)+α (n− n¯s(r, t)). By definition the apartments
already on sale at time t are those that were not sold at time t− 1.
In order to calculate n¯s(r, t) we make the crucial assumption in this mathe-
matical derivation, namely that all buyers at location r and time t − 1 succeed in
securing an apartment. This assumption is correct only if two conditions are met.
First, the number of buyers must be smaller or equal than the number of sellers.
Second, all buyers must afford the dwellings, that is the reservation demand price of
all buyers must be larger than the reservation offer price of all sellers. The validity
of this assumption is checked ex-post in the discussion in Section 3.2.
In any case, if all buyers secure an apartment, we have n¯s(r, t) = ns(r, t− 1)−
nb(r, t− 1). In the steady state,
n?s(r) = n−
1− α
α
n?b(r). (21)
We now calculate the expected reservation prices. Since there is only one income
category, the reservation demand prices are all identical, and correspond to Y = Y1.
On the contrary, the reservation offer prices are heterogeneous, because they depend
on the time on market (Eq. 5). Here we make a slightly simplifying assumption,
namely that the sale probability is the same for all dwellings on the market at
location r, and therefore corresponds to the market tightness q? = n?b/n
?
s. In
fact, cheaper dwellings are more likely to sell in the order book, but comparing to
simulations in Section 3.2 we show that this is a second-order effect.
Using Eq. (5), the expected steady state reservation offer price at a location at
distance r is
E{P s,?}(r) = (1 + µ)P ?(r)E{λ t−tiτ }. (22)
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In the steady state, at each time step a dwelling on the market is sold with prob-
ability q?, and not sold with probability 1 − q?. We can calculate the expected
discount E{λk/τ}, with k = t− ti, by using the geometric distribution:16
E{λk/τ} =
∞∑
k=1
(
λ1/τ
)k−1
(1− q?)k−1 q? = q
?
1− λ1/τ (1− q?) . (23)
We can finally write the market price at distance r from the center, in the steady
state. We use Eqs. (22) and (23) and the definition of market price, that is a
weighted average of the expected reservation and offer prices, with weight ν ∈ [0, 1]:
P ?(r) = νY + (1− ν)E{P s,?}(r). (24)
Rearranging gives Eq. (8).
B.2 Details on the one category case with general util-
ity
The fixed point P ?(r) has the same functional form as in Eq. (8), except that the
ratio A(r)/Z is replaced by V ?(r)/Z?, where
V ?(r) = (Y − P ?(r))1−β (A(r))β , (25)
Z? = 2pi
∫ Rmax
0
w (Y − P ?(w))1−β (A(w))β dw. (26)
The problem is that we cannot explicitly solve for P ?(r) anymore, so we must use
an iterative method. For each value of β, we start from the value of Z? that we
observe in the simulations, and solve Eq. (8) (up to the transformation A(r)/Z →
V ?(r)/Z?) numerically for 10000 values of r, 0 < r < Rmax. We then numerically
compute Z? from Eq. (26) with the trapezoidal method, and iterate this procedure
until convergence for Z? is reached.
C Parameter values
The baseline parameter values are reported in Table 1.
We discuss the calibration choices below:
• λ = 0.95. Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004) analyze one of the most detailed
datasets on listing price changes and offers made between initial listing and
sale agreement. They find that, on average, the first price reduction is 5.3%
and the second reduction is 4.4%. Baptista et al. (2016) also use λ = 0.95,
obtained from Zoopla data (Zoopla is a popular online portal for real-estate
services in England). Finally, Loberto et al. (2018) also find a similar value
from the analysis of a housing advertisements website in Italy.
16Strictly speaking, the sellers decrease their reservation price at intervals of τ time steps, which is
indeed what we do in the numerical simulations. However, in the analytical solution we are implicitly
assuming that they decrease the reservation price by a factor 1/τ every time step.
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Symbol Value Description
N 100 Number of apartments at each location
L 11 Linear size of the grid Ω
a 1 Distance between neighboring locations
R 3 Steepness parameter in the attractiveness
K 10 Number of income categories
Y1 15 Income of the lowest income category
∆ 5 Difference in income between two consecutive categories
β 0.5 Weight given to the attractiveness in the utility function
α 0.1 Probability for housed agents to become sellers
µ 0.1 Markup that the sellers try to apply to the market price
λ 0.95 Discount rate on the reservation offer price
τ 2 Time steps of unsuccessful sale before price revision
ν 0.1 Bargaining power of the seller
Γ 1000 Total number of incoming agents each time step
Table 1: Model parameters.
• Γ = 1000, N = 100, α = 0.1. As shown in Eq. (8), the price is determined
(among other things) by the relative magnitude of these parameters. We
chose these specific values to have a reasonable level of noise. Indeed, with
too few agents (e.g. Γ = 100, N = 10) the random arrival of buyers would
generate wild price fluctuations, and with too many agents (e.g. Γ = 10000,
N = 1000) the price dynamics would almost be deterministic. Finally, note
that in Section 3 we have used Γ = 400 for illustrative purposes.
• β = 0.5. The households value housing and non-housing consumption equally.
• L = 11, Rmax = 6.21, R = 3, a = 1. The attractiveness decreases at R to
approximately 1/3 of its value in the center. With this choice, R is close to
half the radius of the city. Therefore, we have an attractive center and a non-
attractive periphery, which is a necessary condition for price differentiation.
L (or equivalently Rmax) and a just determine the size of the city.
• µ = 0.1, ν = 0.1. This parametrization captures the idea that the sellers
have to post a price, which cannot be much higher than the market price.
Therefore, most bargaining power is on the buyers’ side.
• Y1 = 15, ∆ = 5 and K = 10. These parameters are chosen together to
model a specific income distribution. The absolute magnitudes of Y1 and ∆
do not matter, only their ratio ∆/Y1 determines the inequality in the income
distribution. While these values for Y1 and ∆ have been used to produce
Figure 3, in Table 2 we list all the values that correspond to the twelve income
distributions used in Section 4.
• {Γk/Γ} = (0.25, 0.20, 0.15, 0.10, 0.08, 0.07, 0.06, 0.04, 0.03, 0.02) is the income
category distribution of k-buyers. When varying the income distribution we
only change ∆ and Y1, keeping {Γk/Γ} fixed.
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